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Abstract 
Factors beyond a person’s control, such as demographic characteristics at birth, often influence the 
availability of rewards an individual can expect for their efforts. We know surprisingly little how such 
pay-gaps due to random differences in opportunities impact human motivation. To test this we designed 
a study in which we arbitrarly varied the reward offered to each participant in a group for performing 
the same task. Participants then had to decide whether or not they were willing to exert effort to receive 
their reward. Unfairness reduced participants’ motivation to pursue rewards even when their relative 
position in the distribution was high, despite the decision being of no benefit to others and reducing 
reward for oneself. This relationship was partially mediated by participants’ feelings. In particular, large 
disparity was associated with greater unhappiness, which was associated with lower willingness to work 
– even when controlling for absolute reward and its relative value, both of which also affected decisions 
to pursue rewards. Our findings suggest pay-gaps can trigger psychological dynamics that hurt 
productivity and well-being of all involved. 
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In a system that fulfills meritocratic ideals, rewards are based solely on a person’s ability to 
perform a task. In reality, people can often expect  different rewards for similar effort due to 
non-meritocratic factors beyond their control, including gender (Blau & Kahn, 2007)
 
or race 
(Longhi & Brynin, 2017). Such “pay-gaps” may have significant consequences to society by 
influencing people’s motivation to exert effort in exchange for rewards. This could contribute 
to underachievement and low aspirations among people from disadvanted groups (Elmelech & 
Lu, 2004; Findlay & Wright, 1996; Uhrig, 2015; Boliver, 2013; Crawfowd, Macmillan and 
Vignoles, 2014; Thiele et al., 2017).  
We hypothesize that arbitrary differences in opportunities to earn rewards can negatively 
impact not only on disadvantaged individuals, but also those offered relatively high rewards. 
This is because pay gaps may impact motivation via two mechanisms. On one hand, because 
people engage in spontaneous social comparisons and evaluate their rewards relative to those 
of others (Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997; Hagerty, 2000; Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 2010; Bault 
et al., 2011), pay gaps can increase motivation to pursue rewards of those offered relatively 
high rewards and reduce the motivation of those offered relatively low rewards, irrespective of 
the amount offered. However, at the same time people may have a negative response to the 
unfairness of arbitrary distributions of rewards regardless of which side of the distribution they 
are at, and be less willing to pursue rewards in situations that are unfair. Indeed, it has been 
shown that subjects are less happy when they themselves win in a gambling task but the other 
subject loses, in comparison to when both subjects win
 
(Rutledge et al., 2016). We hypothesize 
that such a negative reaction may have consequences beyond a person’s affective state. 
Specifically, negative feelings can lead to apathy as well as a reduction in the subjective value 
of rewards (Eldar & Niv, 2015), leading to reduced motivation of all members of the group. 
Individuals at the bottom of the distribution could be negatively affected twice, first due to 
their lower relative position and second due to their reaction to unfair distribution.    
Using a controlled laboratory setting, we were able to dissociate and quantify these influences, 
while studying them independently from other factors that are often associated with pay gaps, 
such as demographics or stereotypes. Participants made a series of decisions on whether to 
exert cognitive effort in exchange for a reward while observing the rewards offered to others 
for completing the same task (Fig. 1A). On each trial, we varied: (i) the deviation of payments 
in the group from an equal distribution (thereafter ‘unfairness’), (ii) the relative position of the 
offer in the distribution (thereafter ‘rank’) and (iii) the magnitude of the reward (thereafter 
‘absolute reward’). Participants had no control over the reward’s absolute, nor relative, 
magnitude. After viewing everyone’s offers participants reported their current feelings and 
decided on whether to pursue the reward. We modeled the decisions to exert effort for rewards 
as a function of absolute reward, the offer’s rank within the distribution and unfairness of the 
distribution. This allowed us to test whether these three factors have a unique effect on the 
decisions to pursue rewards. Using a mediation model we tested the hypothesis that the effects 
of these factors on decisions to pursue rewards were mediated by participants’ affective 
response. 
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Fig. 1. Task. Participants arrived in the lab in groups of five. They were introduced to each other, and each 
participant selected cartoon avatar to represent them. They then retired to individual cubicles to complete the 
study. Each trial started with a display of all participants’ reward offers. Participants then rated their current 
feelings and indicated whether they were willing to exert cognitive effort for their reward. If they decided to do 
so, they would complete three math problems. If not, they would move on to the next trial. 
 
 
RESULTS 
We invited participants to the lab in groups of five. After having been introduced, they were 
directed to separate cubicles to complete the study. In each of 60 trials, we presented each 
participant the reward points offered to each of the five members of the group on that trial. 
Participants then rated their feelings (from very happy to very unhappy) and indicated whether 
they were willing to complete three math problems to earn their reward. If they decided to do 
so, they would complete the math problems. If they decided not to, they would move on to the 
next trial. The instructions emphasized that all participants would be solving the same math 
problems. At the end of the study, we selected one trial at random for compensation – a 
common procedure used to avoid the effects of reward accumulation during the task (Charness, 
Gneezy & Halladay, 2016). If the participant had decided not to pursue reward on that trial no 
bonus reward was received. If the participant decided to work for a reward on that trial, they 
would receive the reward offered on that trial. The decision of whether to pursue rewards did 
not influence the rewards offered on future trials or pay-out of other members of the group. 
This information was emphasized in the instructions. After the main part of the experiment, we 
presented all reward distributions again in the same form and order as in the first part of the 
study, this time asking participants about their subjective rating of how equal/unequal was each 
set of rewards offered.  
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Figure 2. Reward distributions. A) We created 30 income distributions based on a log-normal probability 
density function (corresponding to 10 levels of Gini index uniformly distributed between 20 and 65, with 3 
different median values). Log-normal distribution approximates reward distributions encountered in real-world, 
such as income distributions within countries (Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2009) and companies (Lazear & Shaw, 
2007). For illustration purposes figures A, B and C show only ten of these income distributions based on only one 
median value. B) To generate rewards representative for the above distributions, we used an inverse cumulative 
density function of these distributions, which assigns maximal income value earned by each percent of the 
population. C) We next took an average income from each quintile of this function, with the exclusion of the top 
1 percentile, resulting in five representative values for each trial. The unfairness of reward offers used in the 
analysis was quantified based on these five values. D) We transformed values from positively skewed distribution 
to create 30 negatively skewed reward distributions. The resulting distributions had the same range and standard 
deviation of rewards as the positively skewed distributions.  
  
 
On each trial, we independently manipulated: (i) the deviation of payments in the group from 
an equal distribution (‘unfairness’, see methods for equation), (ii) the rank of the reward 
offered to each person within the group (ranging from 1 to 5 - ‘rank’) and (iii) the absolute 
reward offered (i.e., points - ‘absolute reward’). See methods and Fig. 2 for details. 
 
We conducted two experiments (N = 110 in total). The difference between the two experiments 
was that in one experiment the participants knew the exchange rate between reward points 
offered and Great British Pounds (1 point was worth £0.04), in the other experiment it was 
unknown and said to differ on each trial. We replicated the findings across both studies. Thus, 
we report here results from the combined dataset. A separate analysis of each dataset is 
presented in the Supplementary Material. 
 
Pay gaps reduce the motivation to pursue rewards. Participants chose to pursue rewards on 
54% of trials. To test whether the hypothesized factors influenced participants’ choices, we 
used a generalized linear mixed-effects model (GLME) predicting decisions to work for reward 
on every trial from unfairness level of all offers, rank of individual’s offered reward (from 1 to 
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5), and absolute value of the offered reward (expressed as a power function to account for 
diminishing marginal utility; see Methods for details). Additionally, we examined if 
participants reacted to reward offers differently when the minority of individuals are at the top 
of the distribution and the majority at the bottom or vice versa, by including in the model the 
signed skewness of the distribution (measured by Adjusted Pearson’s Coefficient of 
Skewness). The possible effect of fatigue was accounted for by including trial number. All 
three hypothesized factors significantly influenced decisions to work in exchange for rewards. 
In particular, the likelihood of pursuing rewards was greater when (i) unfairness was low (β = 
-0.29, p < 0.001), (ii) rank was high (β = 0.92, p < 0.001) and (iii) absolute reward was high (β 
= 2.82, p < 0.001). In addition, the likelihood of pursuing rewards decreased over time (β = -
1.04, p < 0.001), presumably due to fatigue. Skewness of the distribution did not have a 
significant effect (β = 0.01, p = 0.92).  
 
Similar results are obtained when using particpants’ subjective ratings of unfairness rather than 
an objective calculation  (subjective inequality: β = -0.22, p < 0.001; rank: β = 0.81, p < 0.001; 
absolute reward: β = 2.84, p < 0.001; fatigue: β = -1.02, p < 0.001; skewness: β = -0.20, p < 
0.001). Note, that the difference is that here skeweness is significant. However model 
comparison based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), indicated that the objective 
measure of unfairness provided a better fit (BIC = 3662) than the subjective measure (BIC = 
3778), possibly due to the noisiness of the latter.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Motivation to pursue rewards is higher when distribution of rewards is fair; rank (relative value) is 
high, and absolute reward is high. To illustrate the effect of factors influencing the motivation to pursue rewards, 
we plotted the probability of participants’ decision to pursue rewards from a GLME model predicting choice from 
reward magnitude and either different levels of (A) unfairness or (B) rank. (C) We also plotted average residuals 
for the five rank categories and two levels of unfairness from a GLME model predicting choice just from absolute 
reward and trial number. We observe that participants are more likely to decide to pursue rewards when (A, C) 
rewards are fairly distributed and (B, C) when the rank is high than low. Error bars = SEM. 
 
 
To illustrate the impact of unfairness, we calculated each participant’s probability of pursuing 
rewards at different levels of unfairness and reward magnitudes (based on the estimated fixed 
and random effects from a GLME model predicting decision to pursue rewards only from these 
two factors, setting the other factors to 0). The estimated probabilities were then averaged over 
participants (Fig. 3A). As can be observed, for the same reward magnitude, participants were 
more likely to pursue rewards when unfairness was low rather than high. The indifference point 
 6 
 
(i.e., the reward magnitude for which participants choose to pursue rewards with 50% 
probability) was 27.5 points greater for the highest level of unfairness than for the lowest level. 
 
Next, we plotted the likelihood of pursuing rewards for each reward magnitude across the five 
offer ranks, using the same method as above. As can be observed in Fig. 3B the likelihood of 
pursuing rewards was greater when the rank of the offer is high than when it was low for the 
same absolute value of the reward. For the lowest rank, participants required an additional 66.4 
points to be indifferent on whether to pursue reward than for the highest rank.  
 
To illustrate the effect of unfairness and rank in isolation from the reward magnitude, we 
plotted the residuals from the above GLME model with the effect of unfairness and rank set to 
0. These residuals were then divided into five ranks and two levels of unfairness (high and low 
based on a median split; Fig. 3C). This exercise demonstrates that participants were less likely 
to pursue rewards when unfairness was high (red line) than low (blue line) across different 
ranks. Moreover, participants were more likely to pursue rewards when the rank of their reward 
offer was high than when it was low, across different levels of unfairness. 
 
While large unfairness in the group had a negative effect on motivation, it may be that when 
looking downwards at the less fortunate, large unfairness might increase motivation. To test 
for this possibility, we added to the above GLME model two covariates for each subject and 
trial: the sum of distances between the participant and everyone below them (advantageous 
inequality), and the sum of the distances between the participant and everyone above them 
(disadvantageous inequality). While all three main effects from the original model remained 
significant (unfairness: β = -0.33, p < 0.001; rank: β = 0.87, p < 0.001; absolute reward: β = 
2.67, p < 0.001), neither upward (β = -0.04, p = 0.67) nor downward (β = -0.29, p = 0.08) 
comparisons significantly influenced the willingness to work. In other words, while the relative 
ranking of a participant’s pay offer affects motivation, as does the general level of unfairness, 
once we account for these two factors, having people’s pay be at a greater distance from others’ 
in either direction does not additionally impact their willingness to pursue rewards. 
 
Finally, we compared the original model to two alternative models; (i) the adaptation model, 
which is based on an assumption that people compare their income to an average value for their 
reference group (Helson, 1965), and (ii) the Fehr-Schmidt inequality aversion model, which 
assumes that people have a separate reaction to advanteagous and disadvantageous inequality 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In both we include absolute reward and trial number as covariates. 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which simulatneously assesses model fit and parsimony 
showed that our original model (the ‘rank-unfairness model’) (BIC = 3661.9) outperformed 
both the adaptation model (BIC = 3765.8) and the Fehr-Schmidt inequality model (BIC = 
3780.1), as well models consisting of only rank (BIC = 3681.3), only unfairness (BIC = 
3687.3), or only absolute reward (BIC = 3833.4). Together, the results suggest that high 
unfairness, low rank and low absolute reward all have significant, negative and independent 
effects on the willingness to pursue rewards, and that both unfairness and relative value 
components are necessary to explain the reactions to unequal opportunities. We next examine 
whether these factors exert their effect through participants’ feelings.  
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Feelings partially mediate the effects of pay gaps on decisions to exert effort. To examine 
whether feelings mediated the effects of pay gaps on decisions to pursue rewards we performed 
two multi-level mediation analyses. Each of the mediation analysis examined whether feelings 
mediate the effect of one of the factors identified above (i.e., rank or unfairness), while 
controlling for the absolute reward magnitude, trial number and the other factor.  
 
Fig. 4. Feelings partially mediate the effect of pay gaps on decisions to pursue rewards. We examined whether 
the effect of the two components of the motivational response to pay gaps, that is (A) unfairness and (B) rank, 
were mediated by feelings. In both cases, we controlled for the absolute reward, trial number and either rank (A) 
or unfairness (B) respectively. In both cases, we found significant indirect effect and direct effect (which 
represents the influence of the given factor on decision to pursue rewards, while controlling for the indirect effect), 
suggesting that feelings partially mediate the influence of each of the factors on decisions to pursue rewards. 
 
We found that the effects of unfairness and rank on decision to pursue rewards were both 
partially mediated by feelings (see Fig. 4). First, as we already reported, low unfairness and 
high rank were related to greater likelihood to pursue rewards (total effect: unfairness: β = -
0.019, p < 0.001; rank: β = 0.029, p < 0.001). This effect was partially mediated by feelings 
(path ab: unfairness: β = -0.002, p < 0.001; rank: β = 0.010, p <0.001) with positive feelings 
related to low unfairness and high rank (path a: unfairness: β  = -0.012, p < 0.001; rank: β  = 
0.038, p <0.001). Additionally, feelings predicted decisions to pursue rewards even when 
unfairness and rank were accounted for (path b: unfairness: β = 0.318, p < 0.001; rank: β = 
0.327, p <0.001). This suggests that incidental fluctuations of feelings, unrelated to task 
variables, had also a unique effect on the decision to pursue rewards. Conversely, the two task 
related variables had direct effect on the decision to pursue rewards that could not be accounted 
for by changes in feelings (path c’: unfairness: β = -0.014, p < 0.01; rank: β = 0.013, p <0.001). 
 
Subjective measure of inequality is biased by rank 
Finally, we tested whether participants’ perception of inequality was related to our objective 
measure of statistical dispersion of outcomes (i.e., unfairness) and participants’ relative 
position of the received offer in the distribution (i.e., rank). To examine this, we constructed a 
generalized mixed effects model with participants’ inequality rating as a dependent variable, 
and statistical dispersion and rank as independent variables. We found that both factors 
influenced inequality judgments. First, not surprisingly, the higher the statistical dispersion the 
higher the perceived inequality (β = -0.26, p < 0.0001). Interestingly, the higher the rank of the 
received offer, the more likely participants were to perceive the distribution as equal (β = 0.06, 
p < 0.01). This is despite clear instructions to rate inequlity of all offers in a distribution. These 
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results suggest that a person’s relative position in a distribution affects their assessment of how 
(un)equal that distribution is.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Randomness plays a surprisingly important role in determining the barriers and opportunities 
encountered by individuals on their path to a prosperous life (Pluchino, Biondo, Rapisarda, 
2018). Country of birth alone explains 66% of global variation in living standards (Milanovic, 
2014). Other non-meritocratic factors, such as zip code (Chetty & Henderen, 2018), parental 
socio-economic status (Duncan & Magnuson, 2012), gender (Blau & Kahn, 2007), ethnicity 
(Longhi & Brynin, 2017), or a person’s name (Silberzahnm & Ygknabbm, 2013) have been 
shown to have a significant effect on earnings, even after controlling for merit.  
In the current study we investigated how decisions to pursue rewards are altered by a person’s 
awareness that some people in their group were more lucky than others in the rewards they 
were offered for performing the same task. We hypothesized that the motivation to pursue 
rewards would be influenced by violation of the fairness principle and relative valuation of 
rewards. We find that an unfair distribution of rewards between group members had a negative 
impact on the decision to pursue rewards not only of disadvantaged individuals but also of 
advantaged individuals. Specifically, high unfairness was related to a reduction in the 
likelihood participants agreed to work for their reward irrespective of the magnitude of their 
reward and their relative position in the distribution. This is despite such refusal reducing the 
likelihood of receiving a bonus, while having no impact on the rewards received by others.  
 
Second, the likelihood of exerting effort in exchange for reward was reduced when the rank of 
the offer was lower in comparison to that offered to others and vice versa (i.e., higher rank was 
related to greater motivation to work), irrespective of the actual magnitude of the offered 
reward. The third factor modulating motivation was the absolute reward itself. The fact that 
absolute reward magnitude exerted influence even when controlling for the level of unfairness 
and offer rank suggests that while people do care about the rewards of others, they only partially 
adapt to present social context when deciding whether to pursue rewards (Burke et al., 2016). 
We find that the rank-unfairness model outperforms many alternative formulations in 
explaining particpents’ reactions to pay-gaps.  
 
By manipulating the unfairness of offers, offer’s rank and absolute reward on each trial, we 
were able to dissociate the influence of each of the three factors within the same individual. By 
doing so, we overcome a difficulty in studying these variables in the “real-world”, where 
individuals with different traits or experiences may populate different parts of the distribution 
(Gelissen & de Graaf, 2006)	-	making it difficult to isolate the influence of these components 
from factors correlating with them, such as negative effects of stereotypes on aspirations 
(Migheli, 2015; Riegle-Crumb, Moore, & Ramos-Wada, 2011). Together, these findings 
suggest that individuals who are offered less than others are disadvantaged not only because 
the absolute reward they can possibly obtain is lower, but also because they might suffer from 
a motivational cost reducing the likelihood that they will puruse even those rewards that are 
within their reach. The latter may be due to lower relative value of their rewards and a 
demotivating effect of participating in situation that seem unfair. 
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Importantly, because the decisions to pursue rewards were made in private and did not affect 
anybody but the participant themself, the observed effect of unfairness on motivation cannot 
be attributed to reputation concerns (Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009), reciprocity (Kube, 
Maréchal, & Puppe, 2012) or retribution motives (Suleiman, 1996). Instead, our results suggest 
that unfairness and rank exert their effect on motivation partially by influencing experienced 
feelings. We report a mediation that includes two links: the first is between each of the two 
factors (unfairness and rank) and negative feelings; and the second between negative feelings 
and a reduction in the willingness to exert effort. As for the first link, high unfairness and low 
rank each triggered negative feelings even when controlling for magnitude of the reward 
offered. The negative impact of pay gaps on feelings supports the notion that perception of 
unfairness is reflected in an emotional response
 
(Rutledge et al., 2016) and thus carries a cost 
to one’s psychological well-being. The finding that rank influenced experienced feelings is 
consistent with studies showing that well-being measures are influenced by a person’s standing 
relative to others
 
(Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997; Hagerty, 2000; Boyce, Brown & Moore, 2010). 
 
The second link is between feelings and the willingness to pursue rewards. Although the idea 
that unhappiness is related to low motivation is intuitive, there has not been conclusive 
evidence for it in healthy individuals (for review
 
see: Lucas and Diener, 2003). Past studies 
have mostly examined the relationship between mood and performance level, rather than the 
decision to engage in effort altogether, and produced mixed results. While some researchers 
found a beneficial effect of positive mood induction on performance (Oswald, Proto & Sgroi, 
2015), others found that positive and negative emotions can improve or impair performance 
depending on the nature of the task (Gray, 2001; Phillips et al., 2002; Dreisbach, 2006). With 
regards to the motivation to pursue rewards, we find that unhappiness has a negative effect. 
Lower happiness in our study can either index reaction to lower subjective value of rewards 
offered (Rutledge et al., 2014), or play a causal role in decreasing the value of rewards (Eldar 
& Niv, 2015). The fact that fluctuations in happiness ratings had an additional effect on 
motivation to pursue rewards, indepedent from the effect of variables manipulated in the task, 
suggests that both explanations are plausible. 
 
While our study examines reaction in a controlled laboratory setting it may have implications 
for people’s decisions and reactions outside the lab. We speculate that negative feelings caused 
by arbitrary reward disparities might be one reason why disadvantaged individuals are more 
likely to suffer from anxiety and depression
 
(González et al., 2010; Piccinelli & Wilkinson, 
2000; Lee et al., 2017). Furthermore, decreased motivation caused by unfairness and low 
relative position might make upward mobility particularly difficult, contributing to sustained 
poverty among disadvantaged groups (Elmelech & Lu, 2004; Findlay & Wright, 1996; Uhrig, 
2015). As such, the motivational phenomenon described in this study might constitute yet 
another example of a poverty-trap, that is a situation where having worse prospects triggers 
additional mechanisms ensuring that a person remains poor. It also suggests that any observed 
signs of decreased motivation among disadvantaged groups might be situational, rather than 
stemming from characteristics of these groups, and thus could be a potential target of 
interventions.  
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In our study it was made clear to particpents that they had no control over the magnitude of the 
rewards offered. In contrast, in many everyday situations there is ambiguity about the role of 
randomness in success. Previous studies have shown that in such ambiguous situations, those 
who are advantaged are more likely assume that their economic position is a result of talent 
and effort, while those who are disadvantaged assume it is a result of external circumstances 
(Hunt, 2004; Kluegel and Smith, 1986). Interestingly, we also observed position-dependent 
subjectivity. In particular, we found that those who were offered relatively high rewards 
estimated inequlity as lower than those who were offered relatively low rewards.  
 
While past studies have suggested people are generally averse to unfair distributions of 
rewards, here we uncover their consequences beyond distribution preferences (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Dawes et al., 2007)
 
or impact on affective state (Tricomi et al., 2010; Rutledge 
et al., 2016). We show that unequal pay and opportunity have a negative influence on the 
motivation to work for rewards of not only disadvantaged individuals but also of others around 
them. Our findings provide an empirical framework for considering the impact of pay 
opportunity gaps on individuals, organizations, and societies, suggesting they can trigger 
psychological dynamics that hurt the productivity of all involved. 
 
 
METHODS	
Participants. One hundred and ten participants from University College London subject pool 
were recruited to take part in two experiments: sixty in experiment 1 (mean age 22.1[3.2], age 
range 18 – 35; 38 women) and fifty in experiment 2 (mean age 21.4[2.0]; age range 18 – 35; 
34 women). Across two experiments, 67% of participants originated from Western countries. 
The average self-identified political orientation was 3.52(1.38) on a scale ranging from 1 
(extremely right wing) to 7 (extremely left wing) and was not significantly different from the 
centre of the scale (t(87)=0.12, p = 0.91). All participants started with an initial endowment of 
£10 and were paid an additional bonus based on their decision to accept or reject reward offers 
in exchange for performing a cognitive task in one randomly selected trial. Participants who 
accepted all reward offers were excluded from the data analysis as we could not identify the 
factors influencing their decisions due to lack of behavioral variability, beyond the fact that 
they were maximizing their bonus reward at the end (eight subjects in experiment 1 and seven 
subjects in experiment 2), leaving 52 and 43 participants in each experimental sample 
respectively. None of the subjects rejected all offers. All participants provided written informed 
consent. The experiment was approved by the UCL ethics committee.  
 
Procedure 
Overview. We invited participants to the lab in groups of five. To easily identify themselves 
during the task, they were asked to choose a cartoon avatar that would represent them in the 
study. A randomly drawn lot number determined the order of choosing avatars. Participants 
were informed that each person will be offered a different reward on each trial and that these 
rewards were randomly decided on each trial by a computer program. Next, participants retired 
to separate cubicles where they were given additional instructions. 
 
 11 
 
Participants first completed one practice trial. There were 60 trials in total. On each trial, 
participants observed the rewards offered to all five participants for 6 seconds then rated their 
feelings (self-paced) and decided whether to pursue the reward (self-paced). Below we detail 
each part of the task. 
 
Incentive structure. Bonus reward was contingent on the participant’s decision to pursue 
reward. Participants were informed that at the end of the task a computer program would 
choose one trial at random for payment – a common procedure that was shown to reproduce 
the behavioural results of many decision-making experiments that paid for all trials, while 
reducing the unwanted reward adapatation and accumulation effects (Charness, Gneezy & 
Halladay, 2016). If participants selected to pursue reward on that trial, they would receive the 
amount equal to the number of points displayed on that trial. In Experiment 1 participants were 
aware that each point was worth £0.04. In Experiment 2, the exchange rate of points with £ 
was unknown to the participants and varied randomly from trial to trial ranging from £0.001 to 
£0.08. We employed this manipulation to minimize adaptation and comparisons to rewards 
offered on past trials. Bonus reward could range from £0 to £18.64 in Experiment 1 and from 
£0 to £37.28 in Experiment 2 if the participant decided not to pursue reward on the randomly 
selected trial no bonus was paid out. Consequently, rejecting a reward offer decreased the 
likelihood of receiving a bonus at the end of the task. There was no contingency between 
participants’ decisions or performance and reward offers in subsequent trials. Neither did 
decisions throughout the task influence the pay-outs of other participants. This was conveyed 
in the task instructions and participants had to pass comprehension checks, ensuring that they 
understood the details of the task. 
 
Distribution of reward offers. We created 60 different distributions in total and presented them 
in random order. We generated 30 reward distributions based on a log-normal probability 
density function. Log-normal distribution was chosen as it fits closely real-world income 
structures within firms (Lazear & Shaw, 2016) and countries (Pinkovskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 
2009). To vary the levels of reward magnitude range and statistical dispersion we used a 
combination of 3 different median values (0.55, 1, 1.45) and 10 different standard deviations, 
corresponding to values of the Gini coefficient varying uniformly from 20 to 65 (Fig. 2), 
resulting in 30 different distributions. Log-normal distributions are always positively skewed. 
To generalize our findings, we also included 30 negatively skewed distributions that were a 
mirror-image of the positively skewed distributions by applying the following transformation 
of representative values:  
𝑥"#$%&%'( = 𝑥*, 𝑥,, 𝑥-, 𝑥., 𝑥/  
𝑥0(12&%'( = 𝑥"#$%&%'( −𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑥"#$%&%'( +min 𝑥"#$%&%'(  
 
Where 𝑥0 is subject n payment offer in each trial, 𝑥"#$%&%'( and 𝑥0(12&%'( are payment offers of 
all participants in trials with positively and negatively skewed distributions, respectively.  
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To generate reward offers representative of the above distributions, we used an inverse 
cumulative density function of these distributions which assigns maximal pay value earned by 
each percent of the population. We next took an average pay from subsequent 20 percentiles 
of this function, with the exclusion of top 1 percentile, resulting in 5 values reflecting an 
average pay of each 20% of the population. The last percentile was excluded as it approaches 
infinity. Unfairness was quantified based on these 5 representative values. To introduce 
variability to the middle pay (that otherwise would be the same for all distributions generated 
from the same median value) we additionally subtracted a number between 0 and 9 from each 
representative value in each distribution (in each distribution the same number was subtracted 
for each value). This resulted in the pay offers shown in Supplementary Table 1.  
 
Feelings ratings. After presenting the reward offers participants rated how happy they felt by 
clicking on a continuous sliding scale ranging from very unhappy to very happy. The slider 
started in the middle of the scale on every trial.  
 
Inequality ratings. The second task started immediately after the first. Participants were 
informed that they will have to judge how equal the pay distribution was on a scale varying 
from very unequal to very equal. We used 60 income distributions from the first task and 
displayed them in the same form and order.  
 
Math task. Participants then indicated if they wanted to pursue reward on that trial. If they 
decided to pursue reward, they would solve a math task. Otherwise, they immediately 
proceeded to a new trial. The task comprised of solving three math problems. Each problem 
required adding two 3-digit numbers. To ensure equal difficulty of math problems throughout 
the task, each addition had exactly two carryovers (sum of ones, tens or hundreds greater than 
10). E.g., problems included sums like 118 + 197. If participants provided an incorrect answer, 
they had to solve an additional problem. Participants continued until they got three problems 
correct. On average 89% of attempts were correct, and it took subjects 17 seconds (SD = 7.56s) 
on average to solve each problem. 
 
Data analysis 
All the analyses were performed using MATLAB 2017b software.  
 
Dependent variables.  Feelings ratings were transformed to range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating 
a low score (i.e., very unhappy). Decisions to exert effort were coded as categorical variables, 
with 1 indicating accepting a reward offer and 0 indicating rejecting the reward offer.  
 
Independent variables.  
To account for a possibility of diminishing marginal utility of each additional awarded point, 
we tested if the effect of reward magnitude was better expressed as a linear or a power function 
(as it is in the prospect theory: Tversky & Kahneman, 1992): 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑	𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒	𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 	𝑥%
G    
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Where 𝑥 is the reward offer, and 𝜌 represents parameter describing the curvature of the reward 
function, ranging from 0 to 1 (at which point it is linear). To fit the above function, we estimated 
nonlinear mixed-effects model with stochastic Expectation-Maximization algorithm (Delyon, 
Lavielle, & Moulines, 1999). The 𝜌 value maximizing the R
2
 of the model describing the 
relationship between reward magnitude and motivation to pursue rewards (including the 
variables listed in the section below) was equal to 0.43, suggesting a non-linear relationship 
between absolute reward and its value, and was subsequently used in all analyses.  
 
Participant’s offer rank was normalized to range from 0 to 1 as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘& =
𝑖 − 1
𝑛 − 1
 
 
Where i is the reward offer index in a set of offers ordered from lowest to highest and n is the 
number of participants in the group (in our case 5). The above rank measure assigns 1 to the 
person with the best offer, 0 to the person with the lowest offer, and 0.5 to the person with the 
intermediate offer.  
 
Unfairness were measured as Gini coefficient, calculated as follows: 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =
1
𝑛,
𝑥% − 𝑥N
0
NO*
0
%O*
2𝑥
 
 
Where n is the number of participants in the group, 𝑥%and 𝑥Nis the reward offers received by 
each person, and 𝑥 is the mean reward offer.   
 
Advantaegous and disadvantageous inequality in the Fehr-Schmidt model were calculated as 
follows (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999): 
𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑢𝑠	𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑥% − 𝑥N , 0
0
NO*
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠	𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑥N − 𝑥% , 0
0
NO*
 
 
Where 𝑥% is an individual’s payment offer and 𝑥N are payment offers received by other group 
members.   
 
Skewness was measured as Adjusted Pearson’s Coefficient of Skewness, calculated as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛Y𝑠	𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑜𝑓	𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 =
𝑛 𝑛 − 1
1
𝑛
𝑥% − 𝑥
-0
%O*
𝑛 − 2
1
𝑛
𝑥% − 𝑥
,0
%O*
-
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Where 𝑥 is the average reward offer, n is the number of participants in the group, 𝑥% is the 
reward offer received by each person. 
 
To obtain standardized coefficients in the Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model, all 
variables were z-scored prior to the analyses.  
 
Generalized linear mixed-effects model. To account for within-subject correlations of 
responses related to repeated measures in our design, we used Generalized Linear Mixed 
Effects (GLME) model approach, in which fixed effects describe group-level effects and 
random effects describe idiosyncrasies specific for an individual. The GLME model included 
decisions to pursue rewards as the categorical dependent variable. The independent variables 
were unfairness (measured as gini coefficient), rank (normalized to range from 0 to 1, for 
lowest and highest rank respectively), reward magnitude (expressed as a power function). All 
variables were standardized prior to the analysis. Following methodological recommendations 
by Barr and collegues (2013), all models included fixed and random effects for intercept and 
all independent variables.  
 
To illustrate the size of the effect of unfairness and rank we plotted predicted values of the 
above GLME model across different levels of unfairness (Fig 3A) and separately, across 
different ranks (Fig 3B), with the effect of trial number, rank (only for Fig 3A) and unfairness 
(only for Fig 3B) set to 0. To illustrate the effect of unfairness and rank in isolation from reward 
magnitude (Fig 3C), we estimated the probability of pursuing rewards on each trial from a 
GLME model including absolute reward and trial number (with other factors fixed to 0). We 
then calculated the residuals, by subtracting observed decisions and their predicted probability. 
We categorized residuals into 5 ranks and two levels of unfairness (based on the middle value 
of the tested range) and calculated the average residual value for each participant within each 
category and plotted the averages over participants within each category.  
 
Mediation analysis. We used a multilevel mediation analysis approach (Kenny, Korchamaros, 
& Bolger, 2003), which nests trial-level observations within upper-level units (individual 
participants), similarly to the GLME approach described above. The analysis was performed 
using M3 Mediation Toolbox for MATLAB (Wager et al., 2008). Bootstrapping approach, a 
non-parametric method based on resampling with replacement, was used to estimate the 
significance of the effects, using the standard 10000 samples
 
(Hayes, 2009). To control for the 
fact that independent variables in our design were correlated and ensure that the conclusion of 
the mediation analysis relates specifically to the investigated variable, each mediation model 
was performed on residuals from a GLME model regressing out the effect of the variable not 
tested. That is regressing out trial number, and: (i) reward magnitude and rank for the mediation 
model describing the effect of unfairness, or (ii) reward magnitude and unfairness for the 
mediation model describing the effect of rank; on both feelings and decisions to pursue 
rewards. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
Table S1. Distributions of payment offers between participants (expressed in points) for 
each trial presented in the experiment  
Rank 
5
th
 4
th
 3
rd
 2
nd
 1
st
 
25 31 36 42 54 
22 29 35 42 59 
19 27 34 43 65 
17 25 33 44 73 
15 23 32 45 82 
13 21 31 47 94 
10 19 30 48 110 
8 17 29 50 129 
7 15 28 52 155 
5 14 27 55 189 
34 44 51 60 79 
30 41 50 62 88 
27 39 49 64 98 
23 36 48 66 111 
20 34 47 68 127 
17 31 46 71 146 
15 29 46 74 170 
12 26 45 77 201 
10 24 44 81 242 
7 21 43 87 297 
48 64 76 90 119 
43 60 75 93 133 
38 57 74 96 150 
33 53 73 100 170 
29 50 72 104 196 
25 47 71 109 226 
21 43 70 114 265 
18 40 69 120 315 
15 37 68 127 379 
12 33 67 136 466 
25 37 43 48 54 
22 39 46 52 59 
19 41 50 57 65 
17 46 57 65 73 
15 52 65 74 82 
13 60 76 86 94 
10 72 90 101 110 
8 87 108 120 129 
7 110 134 147 155 
5 139 167 180 189 
34 53 62 69 79 
30 56 68 77 88 
27 61 76 86 98 
23 68 86 98 111 
20 79 100 113 127 
17 92 117 132 146 
15 111 139 156 170 
12 136 168 187 201 
10 171 208 228 242 
7 217 261 283 297 
48 77 91 103 119 
43 83 101 116 133 
38 92 114 131 150 
33 103 130 150 170 
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29 121 153 175 196 
25 142 180 204 226 
21 172 216 243 265 
18 213 264 293 315 
15 267 326 357 379 
12 342 411 445 466 
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Table S2. Influence of unfairness, rank and absolute reward on experienced feelings. 
GLME model predicting self-reported feelings.  
 
 Coefficient (SE) T-stat P-value 
Intercept 0.45(0.015) 29.94 < 0.0001 
Trial -0.05(0.006) -8.44 < 0.0001 
Absolute reward 0.095(0.008) 11.85 < 0.0001 
Rank 0.070(0.009) 8.08 < 0.0001 
Unfairness -0.011(0.004) -3.60 < 0.0001 
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Table S3. GLME model predicting decisions to pursue rewards in Experiment 1 (value 
of points known). 
 
 Coefficient (SE) T-stat P-value 
Intercept 1.10(0.60) 1.83 < 0.01 
Trial -1.45(0.17) -8.37 < 0.0001 
Absolute reward 4.33(0.42) 10.27 < 0.0001 
Rank 0.37(0.12) 3.13 < 0.0001 
Unfairness -0.14(0.09) -1.98 0.058 
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Table S4. GLME model of decisions to pursue rewards, Experiment II (value of points 
unknown). 
 
 Coefficient (SE) T-stat P-value 
Intercept 0.63(0.31) 1.98 0.047 
Trial -1.05(0.11) -9.77 < 0.0001 
Absolute reward 2.84(0.22) 12.48 < 0.0001 
Rank 0.91(0.10) 8.66 < 0.0001 
Unfairness -0.29 (0.22) -4.82 < 0.0001 
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